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BOOK REVIEWS
Limiting Technology in the Process of Negotiating Death
Nancy Dubler, LL.B."
Managing Death in the Intensive Care Unit: The Transition from Cure to Comfort.
Edited by J. Randall Curtis and Gordon D. Rubenfeld. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001. Pp. 388.
Death is a negotiated event; it happens by design. Whereas accident or
negligence may occasionally intervene as an independent cause, 70% of
the 1.3 million Americans who die in health care institutions do so after a
decision has been made and implemented to forego some or all forms of
medical treatment.' One can only assume that this percentage has
increased during the last decade as technological advances increasingly
permit support of single organ function at the expense of integrated
conscious existence.
Two powerful forces in health care evolved in the 1990s to affect the
course and conduct of medicine at the end of life. Both are reflected,
although not presented in sufficiently sharp focus, in the series of essays
collected in the thoughtful volume, Managing Death in the Intensive Care
Unit: The Transition from Cure to Comfort, edited by J. Randall Curtis and
Gordon D. Rubenfeld. First, death has re-emerged as an acceptable
outcome of medical practice, even in the intensive care unit, for patients
whose prognosis is hopeless. Second, financial disincentives for long-term
hospital stays must make us wary of determining the prognosis of
hopelessness too easily. Capitated systems and prospective payment
mechanisms provide incentives for shortened lengths of stay. This financial
fact of life must not be permitted to contaminate decisions about death.
These evolutions, one clinical and one economic, have combined to
force health care organizations and institutions to reevaluate their
practices and protocols for managing patients at the end of life and
especially in expensive intensive care units. In the aggregate, the results
may be beneficial to patients and families as new perceptions and practices
* Nancy Dubler is the Director of the Division of Bioethics for the Department of
Epidemiology and Social Medicine at Montefiore Medical Center, and she is a Professor of
Bioethics at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine.
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limit the endless process of dying that had become the norm in many
health care centers. But not surprisingly, dangers of discrimination,
creation of levels of care linked to layered reimbursement, and
unnecessarily hastened deaths lurk in newly found perceptions of palliative
and hospice care.
Most of the chapters in this book are well conceptualized and clearly
written, and some provide valuable tools for professionals seeking to offer
appropriate and compassionate care to patients and their families. Both
physicians and nurses provide data, algorithms, and scripts to assist
intensive care unit (ICU) staff in providing compassionate care. Having
recently attended a working group of clinicians and clergy where
physicians were virtually begging for scripts to follow in the uncomfortable
arena of spiritual values, I find that many chapters provide clearly useful
and practical guidelines that address how to speak to, evaluate, and treat
the dying patient in pain, and how to approach and support the family.
Nonetheless, there are certain micro- and macro-ethical themes
addressed in the book that require more explicit development. If staff
members are to be able to negotiate effectively between and among the
parties who must cooperate in order to permit a "good" death, they must
have the perceptions and skills to assess, evaluate, and manage conflict.
2
Misunderstandings, disagreements, and disputes are inevitable in the
context of life and death decisions when individual history and preference
must combine with present prognosis according to principles of
probability. Techniques of mediation and negotiation can facilitate a
dynamic process that reflects, but is independent of, ethical principles of
individual choice.
Nowhere is this point more evident than in the various discussions of
the notion of "futility" that emerge in multiple chapters. As in many
discussions, futility is conceptualized by all of the authors as a binary
mode-either care is futile or non-futile. Yet, I would argue that except for
those rare instances in which the cases reported in the medical literature
demonstrate "no possible benefit," the notion of futility exists somewhere
on a sliding scale of benefit and burden. But what it more commonly
reflects is the fact that communication between the surrogates and the
physician has broken down. The term futility is a trump card played by the
physician to deny requested care and to end the discussion. What is
needed at that point is not the blunt instrument of physician-exercised
power-the doctrine of futility-but rather a nuanced process to bring the
family to recognize the scant possibility of benefit and burdens of
continued care.3 In such circumstances, techniques of mediation that set
the stage, level the playing field, invite discussion, identify positions, and
1 (2001l)
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seek consensus among conflicting conceptions of a good care plan will be
far more helpful than asserting and insisting on physician power to
decide-the essence of the futility discussion.4 In pursuit of that consensus,
time-limited trials and variations in ICU visitation rules may provide the
redress of medical power that makes agreement possible. As death reflects
more of a negotiated process rather than a discrete event, collaboration
and negotiation will need to replace the raw exercise of power that
appealing to "futility" represents.
When examining the likely effects of easier access to death for
patients, families, medicine, and society, a microanalysis that focuses on
forging a patient-care plan must be accompanied by a macroanalysis
emphasizing more global themes. These themes include differential access
to care, the problem of the uninsured and underinsured, the wise
stewardship of scarce institutional resources, corporate contracting
arrangements that search out cost-effective care, and the ever-present
dangers of racism and discrimination in provision of services. This analysis
should take place in the context of the principle that ICU care is, and
should remain, a scarce resource whose use is restricted to those patients
whose prior health status and level of function can be restored. This is so
because limitation of health care expenditures is an ethical and not merely
an economic issue. If we, as a society, are to have effective public
education, infrastructure, cultural institutions, and other indicia of a good
society, then we must limit the costs of medicine.
The assumption of the appropriateness of scarcity leads me to contest
one of the premises of this volume, that it presents the "state of the art in
caring for dying patients in the ICU.''6 It may be that determining when a
patient is dying is an ICU function, but this is only valid as the precursor to
transfer from the ICU to a more appropriate level of care. No rule is
absolute, but if the ICU remains a limited resource it must be used wisely
by admitting those who can benefit and denying admission or transfer to
those who cannot. Intensive care units need to save the lives of salvageable
patients but do not necessarily need to manage the resulting deaths.7
Other sites and staffs in the hospital may be better at, and more cost-
effectively situated for, end-of-life care. Nonetheless, ICUs must be better
prepared for the eventuality that some proportion of patients will die in
the units.
I would also disagree that "good end-of-life care is like an art: it is
difficult to define, but you know it when you see it."" This book belies the
statement. A good professional knowledge base, quality communication
skills (rated as high as clinical skills by family members), and a willingness
to face the modest benefit that continued care will likely provide, combine
3
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to offer a basis for presentation of options and negotiation of a
coordinated care plan.9 There are some artful elements, but many of the
necessary techniques can be learned.
At the level of individual rights, a series of chapters in the book focus
on the need for discussion with the patient, which is generally not possible
when the person is in the ICU. As an alternative, the author discusses
reliance on advance directives and family narratives. In these chapters, the
author constructs pleas for a change in climate and perspective to
emphasize truth telling. I would argue that if this is to occur, however, it
must be accompanied by a new principle of "intellectual modesty." Often
there is no truth to tell; the doctor can only relay past data and fashion a
prognosis in light of published studies. When those studies offer dire
predictions, respect for the patient, compassion for the family, and regard
for the integrity of medicine should combine to offer a realistic prognosis.
Clinical exposure and discussion of medical uncertainty is the only fair way
to prepare family members for the death of the patient.
However, there is another perception about families that receives little
attention in any of these essays. While the notion that families need
support is addressed, their need for protection is equally important. l It is
commonplace for ICU clinical staff to reach the decision that a patient is
dying and take appropriate steps to avoid prolonging the process.
Decisions to permit death are part of the regular business of diagnosis and
prognosis within the realm of illness and disease. But family members have
no comparable intellectual framework and no matching emotional
distance. For them, the death of the patient will leave an unfillable void.
Compassion for family members requires that medical staff shoulder the
responsibility for the decision to permit death without disempowering
families' rights to make decisions." This is no easy matter. The legal rules,
ethical principles, and medical conventions of decision making by family
members preclude the medical team from usurping the decision. 2 But
compassion requires that medical staff absorb the burden of the decision
so that the family does not perceive itself as the cause of the patient's
death; this is the artful part of end-of-life care.
One of the negative consequences of medical decision making in this
litigious era is the insistence that if the patient or family have the right to
decide, then they must shoulder the burden of the decision. This theme is
evident in the risk-management notions of informed consent that
emphasize the litany of risks over the balance of risks and benefits. In
order to protect against the later possibility of legal liability, the locus of
decision must be clearly separated from the medical professionals involved
in care. That is a foolish consequence of our tort system and the litigious
I1(2001)
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society it encourages, and it is also a terrible basis for allocating the
components of the decision-making process at the end-of-life. If
institutions want to focus on liability for end-of-life care, they should be
concerned about the fact that physicians who are not specialists in
intensive care have half the success of intensivists in treating very sick
patients. This provides powerful support for specially trained intensive
care staff and a warning to institutions that permit community-based
physicians to supervise the care of imperiled patients. 3
But this sea change in medical perspective and the goals of physician
communication will require a robust discussion within society, rather than
a debate cloaked in the framework of court cases whose fact patterns often
distort the discussion to force the narrative to conform to preexisting
common law principles. This re-conceptualization of the debate began
with the emergence of palliative care as a separate consulting discipline.
The public discussion in the media of a "good" death has also contributed
to this change. Reconstructing the grim reaper not as the enemy, but as a
welcome friend, will take time and require reframing the goals of
14
medicine. But it will require changes in "hospital culture, physician
practices, and societal expectations" to really move practice."
This book is another entry into the expanding discussion of end-of-life
care. It applies to the ICU, but even more so to other medical staff who
treat dying patients and support their families. It reflects the reality that
medicine is adjusting its Olympian stance to the realities of chronic disease
and the aging of the population. Patients and families have noticed that
the SUPPORT study revealed that over 50% of patients die in moderate to
severe pain, and that endless days in the ICU may extend dying, but may
not reverse a declining quality of life. 16 Medicine has acted as prince of the
realm of death for the last fifty years. It has ushered in new techniques for
treating illness. It must now learn to ease death as it previously enhanced
life.
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Gostin on Public Health Law
David P. Fidler, J.D., M.Phil.*
Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint. By Lawrence 0. Gostin. Berkeley:
University of California Press and the Milbank Memorial Fund, 2000. Pp. 518.
When I was invited to review Professor Larry Gostin's new book, Public
Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint,1 I immediately said yes despite the fact
that my schedule could scarcely bear another deadline. I had the privilege
in May 1999 to read and comment on some early chapters of Gostin's book
for the Milbank Memorial Fund, which is a co-publisher of the book.2
Those early chapters whet my appetite for the completed book, which has
now been published .
Before I had read a single word of the final product, I was primed to
consume what promised to be an outstanding contribution to
understanding the complex relationship between public health and law.
Gostin's earlier scholarship on public health law has proved important to
my efforts to address the neglected relationship between international law
and public health. I could not pass up the opportunity to devour and
digest Gostin's book and do my part to disseminate the learning it
contains.
The book's publication coincides well with this Journa's debut. The
Journal is a unique product of the collaborative energies of faculty and
students from medicine, public health, and law-all disciplines for which
Gostin has been a teacher and colleague. Gostin intends for his book to
speak to the many disciplines affected by, and struggling to contribute to,
the pursuit of healthier human populations. And when Gostin speaks,
people listen.
Gostin's book further arrives at a timely moment because concern
about the status of public health in the United States seems to be
increasing. Concern about emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases,
the growing threat of antimicrobial resistance, the implications of the West
Nile virus outbreak in the Northeast, and fears about bio-terrorism have all
concentrated attention in recent years on the fragmented and under-
funded condition of public health in the United States. While public
* David P. Fidler is a Professor of Law at Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
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health officials have been sounding warnings for years, others, such as
journalist Laurie Garrett,4 have now picked up the message of alarm, and
are making the case for public health to a larger audience in order to
stimulate remedial action.
In this time of ferment and concern for public health in the United
States, Public Health Law makes a seminal contribution that, I predict, will
dominate for the foreseeable future how students and scholars from
multiple disciplines approach the role of law in American public health.
I. LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES
The basic message of Public Health Law is that "law is essential for
creating the conditions for people to lead healthier lives."' Many people,
including health-care professionals, often view medicine and law as
antagonistic disciplines. But this popular perception confuses health care
and public health. In his Preface, Gostin points out that the contemporary
study of the relationship between law and health is dominated by
"medicine and personal health care services-clinical decision-making,
delivery, organization, and finance."' Gostin argues that the population-
health perspective provided by public health has been missing in the work
done on health care law or health law.' Gostin designed his book to
address this neglect.8
Curiously, although Gostin states that public health law has been
"perennially neglected" as a field of study, he does not explain why such
neglect occurred and what the consequences are for public health. 9 One
could read the book and conclude that law as an instrument of public
health has not been neglected but has instead been used extensively for
decades at all levels of government in a wide variety of contexts to promote
and protect the public's health. After all, Gostin identifies an impressive
collection of legal issues in public health that governments and courts have
been addressing for a long period of time. In fact, such a book could not
have been written if there was not already a large body of law in existence.
What, then, does Gostin mean when he says that public health law has
been neglected?
The reader must discern the reasons why public health law has been
neglected from the structure and argument of the book: Public health law
has been neglected because of its broad, diffuse scope and immense
complexity; and this neglect has produced law that compromises the ability
of the United States to balance properly public health objectives and
individual rights and liberties. The neglect that public health generally has
endured for the past few decades may also contribute to the neglect of
public health law, but Gostin does not explore this important factor.
I1(2001)
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When Gostin refers to the perennial neglect of public health law, he
also means that neither legal nor public health scholars or practitioners
have ever really conceived of "public health law" as a distinct field of
inquiry. In American democratic society, law and legal frameworks shape
every endeavor. Public health is no different. But, while many areas of
social action have attracted significant conceptual and practical legal
attention from scholars and practitioners, public health has largely been
ignored as a field of legal analysis. The neglect is primarily intellectual
rather than practical because governments and public health agencies
have continued to rely on and add to public health law in their everyday
activities.
But, when we realize how much law shapes public health as a social
value and determines governmental activity in this area, the intellectual
neglect of public health law means that we lack a framework to understand
how and why law is critical to the objective of public health. We see the
individual trees but not the forest-the larger ecosystem in which law and
the protection of population health intertwine in ways that we should
understand given the importance of the values of the rule of law and
public health. While I would have liked Gostin to explore why public
health law has been neglected, this desire does not detract from his correct
identification of the problem and his ambitious attempt to organize,
explain, analyze, and seek to improve how the public health law ecosystem
functions.
It is important to emphasize the enormity of the task Gostin set himself
in addressing the lack of interest in public health law in the United States.
The first challenge relates to the concept of "public health," which public
health practitioners define very broadly. Gostin cites the Institute of
Medicine's definition of "public health" as "what we, as a society, do
collectively to assure the conditions for people to be healthy."'° This
definition reveals that public health cannot be narrowly viewed as, for
example, merely the low prevalence of infectious diseases in society. Public
health is concerned with the whole panoply of possible threats to human
health, which gives public health law an enormous scope.
The second challenge arises in explaining how the American legal
system-a very complicated, sophisticated, textured machine-works in the
context of public health. The machinery defies simplification, even before
one considers sorting out how the machinery operates in the vast terrain of
public health. Thus, the ambition in Gostin's book is quite breathtaking.
I stress the enormity of the task because some people, both in public
health and law, may find that Gostin does not analyze with sufficient depth
many of the public health and legal issues, principles, and problems the
9
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book addresses. Lawyers may find themselves hungry for more detailed
legal analysis, while public health experts may find that the law
overshadows public health concepts and principles. These understandable
reactions should be tempered with an appreciation of Gostin's attempt to
conceptualize public health law as a discrete field valuable to both the legal
and public health professions.
Gostin defines" public health law" as follows:
Public health law is the study of the legal powers and duties of the state to
assure the conditions for the people to be healthy (e.g., to identify,
prevent, and ameliorate risks to health in the population) and the
limitations on the power of the state to constrain the autonomy, liberty,
proprietary, or other legally protected interests of individuals for the
protection or promotion of community health."
Chapter 1 of the book explores this definition to delineate the
conceptual boundaries of the role of law in public health-or what Gostin
calls the theory of public health law. This theory identifies five essential
features of public health law: (1) the special responsibility of the
government for public health activities; (2) the focus on the health of
populations; (3) the relationship between the state and the population or
between the state and individuals or private enterprises that place the
greater community at risk; (4) the provision by the government of
population-based services grounded in the scientific methodologies of
public health; and (5) the power of the government to coerce individuals
and private enterprises in order to protect the larger community from
health risks.
12
One of the great strengths of the book is that it grounds the study of
public health law in the larger framework of the rule of law in the United
States. As Gostin argues:
Public health law should not be seen as an arcane, indecipherable set of
technical rules buried deep within state health codes. Rather, public
health law should be seen as broadly as the authority and responsibility of
the government to assure the conditions for the population's health. As
such, public health law has transcending importance in how we think
about government, politics, and policy in America.1
Gostin successfully demonstrates the fundamental duty governments
have at the local, state, and federal levels to protect and promote the
public's health and how central law is to the fulfillment of this
governmental duty. The book serves not only as an overview of the role of
law in public health but also as an exploration of the rule of law's
I1(2001)
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importance to the American way of government.
Readers who are knowledgeable about the current crisis in American
public health might, however, scratch their heads when Gostin argues that
public health law has transcending importance in U.S. politics and
governance. The gradual crumbling of the U.S. public health system
provides weak evidence that anything connected to public health is
transcendent in the United States. Clearly Gostin's argument is normative
not descriptive, but these observations suggest that Gostin could have given
a more contemporary public health context to support his aspiration "to
create a record of the field of public health law at the turn of the
",14millennium."
Also missing from the book's theory of American public health law is
any perspective that public health in the United States is connected to
international and global issues and forces, actors, and rules that complicate
the use of law to promote and protect public health . In a time when local,
national, and international public health officials and experts are
struggling to come to grips with what has been called the globalization of
public health, it was strange to see no discussion in Public Health Law of
matters beyond American shores. For example, Gostin argues that
constitutional, statutory, administrative, and tort law represent the
"analytical methods and tools of public health law." 6 Conspicuously absent
from the methods and tools of American public health law is international
law. The United States is a party to many treaties that directly and
indirectly relate to public health, including the Constitution of the World
Health Organization (WHO), the International Health Regulations, the
World Trade Organization, North American Free Trade Agreement, and
international legal agreements on environmental protection. The United
States is also a key player in the development of new international law,
such as WHO's proposed framework convention on tobacco control. Why
is international law not part of the theory and practice of American public
health law? 7
In some respects, Gostin's decision not to include international and
global issues was refreshing because it communicated the continuing
importance of local, state, and national efforts on public health and did
not treat the globalization phenomenon in public health through the
repetition of shallow globo-rhetoric. Still, Gostin's approach treats public
health law in the United States as if America is isolated and unaffected by
the public health problems in, and threats from, other countries. It does
not seem prudent to me "to provide an honest account of the doctrine and
the controversies facing the field [of public health law] in the year 2000"'8
without including any analysis of international legal issues directly relevant
11
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to public health.
II. THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
Part One of Public Health Law analyzes the conceptual foundations of
American public health law. After the definition and theory of public
health law are provided in Chapter 1, Gostin gives an overview of the
structure and dynamics of the American system of public health law.
Chapter 2 (Public Health in Constitutional Design) and Chapter 3
(Constitutional Limits on the Exercise of Public Health Powers:
Safeguarding Individual Rights and Freedoms) explore the structure of
American public health law through the governing framework established
by the U.S. Constitution. The key structural elements Gostin examines in
Chapters 2 and 3 are federalism, the separation of powers, and notions of
limited government to protect individual liberties.
Grounding public health law in the American constitutional system is
critical because the governmental duties to assure the conditions necessary
for a healthy population are divided, distributed, and disciplined by the
Constitution. Gostin effectively communicates the complicated
constitutional principles that guide the pursuit of public health. If I have
any quarrel with the way Gostin structures his analysis of federalism, it is
with his treatment of state public health powers after his analysis of the
federal role in public health. Under the Constitution, direct public health
powers belong to state governments, not the federal government; most
public health policy, law, and expenditures originate, as a result of the
constitutional design, at the state level. Gostin's analysis in Chapter 2 gives
pride of place to the federal government's public health powers and role.' 9
Gostin does, however, discuss the conflicts that federalism creates in public
health between the federal government and state governments by
analyzing the Lochner era through to the Supreme Court's more recent
decisions (Lopez,20 New York,2' and Seminole Tribe22) that contain a "new
federalism" that limits more the power of the federal government to
regulate intrastate activities.
Gostin's analysis of the federal government's powers in the public
health context focuses on the constitutional authorities to tax, spend, and
regulate interstate commerce. The federal government's powers to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, make treaties with foreign
nations, and conduct the nation's foreign policy are important powers in
the public health context that Gostin does not mention. It is these federal
powers that have sustained the United State's involvement in international
public health efforts since the nineteenth century, including U.S.
leadership and participation in the creation and operation of the Pan
I1(2001)
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American Sanitary Bureau, Office International d'Hygiine Publique, and
the WHO. Gostin's failure to mention these federal powers in the
constitutional design reflects the book's lack of an international
perspective on American public health law.
Chapter 3 expands on the notion of limited government by analyzing
the constraints the Constitution places on government power in order to
protect individual rights, and how these limits affect the pursuit of public
health. The tension between the government's power to act on behalf of
the public's health and the constitutional protection of individual rights
dominate Public Health Law. Not only does Gostin explore this tension
conceptually in Chapter 3, but he also focuses on this issue in Part Two of
the book, which contains six chapters. He also raises this theme in other
chapters. More than half of Public Health Law is, thus, devoted to the
public health-individual rights tension.
In the Preface, Gostin questions "the primacy of individual freedom
(and its associated concepts-autonomy, privacy, and liberty) as the
prevailing social norm. 24 He also questions the assertion associated with
the late Jonathan Mann that respect for human rights and public health
are synergistic.2' While Gostin admits that there is validity in the
Mannesque position, he asserts that public health and individual rights
"sometimes cannot coexist."26 1 return to this issue in my discussion of Part
Two of the book below.
The final chapter of Part One-Chapter 4 (Public Health Regulation:
A Systematic Evaluation)-provides an overview of the dynamics of public
health law in the United States. While Chapters 2 and 3 were mainly
descriptive, Chapter 4's focus on public health regulation is prescriptive
because Gostin develops criteria to guide policymakers and courts in their
respective considerations of public health law. Because public health
regulation involves trade-offs between public goods and private interests,
governments must justify intervention to promote population health.
Gostin identifies three classical justifications for public health intervention:
(1) the harm principle-competent adults have freedom of action unless
they pose a risk to others; (2) the protection of incompetent persons, such
as children or the mentally ill, to ensure their health and safety; and (3)
the regulation of self-regarding behavior, or paternalism.
Gostin argues that the state bears the burden ofjustification and has to
demonstrate the existence of significant risk to the public health in order
to intervene. He explores risk analysis in public health law by presenting
four factors to consider: the nature of the risk, its duration, the probability
of harm, and the severity of harm. While these factors closely align with
science, Gostin properly cautions that social values also play a role in risk
13
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assessment and management.
But the government's job is not finished when it has identified a
significant health risk because it must also show that (1) the intervention
has a good chance of being effective because the means and ends are
reasonably related; (2) the public health benefits are proportional to the
economic and other costs; and (3) the intervention produces a fair
distribution of benefits, costs, and burdens in society.
Gostin acknowledges that this framework for making public health
decisions does "not invariably lead to the best policy because any analysis is
fraught with judgments about politics and values and is confounded by
scientific uncertainty." 27 Gostin hopes, however, that his systematic analysis
provides a structure that will help public health authorities and politicians
craft and apply consistent standards when making policy and law.
III. BALANCING CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC HEALTH OBJECTIVES IN
AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
Part Two of Public Health Law contains five chapters, each of which
analyzes what Gostin believes is a conflict between the enjoyment of civil
liberties and the effective pursuit of public health. See Table 1 for an
overview of Part Two.
It would be foolhardy and impossible for me to try to comment in
detail about the massive amount of public health and legal materials
Gostin expertly organizes and analyzes in these chapters. He succeeds in
covering very complicated legal areas comprehensively yet concisely, as
well as always tying his discussion firmly to the objectives of public health.
Gostin combines analysis of the background legal principles and
frameworks with exploration of current hot topics in public health law,
such as health information privacy, HIV screening of pregnant women and
infants, and litigation against the tobacco and firearms industries.
My concerns with Part Two are, on the whole, minor. The sections in
Chapter 9 on public health and the rise of the administrative state and the
regulatory tools of public health agencies struck me as information the
reader needed in Part One of the book when Gostin was laying down the
basics of public health law. Chapter 10's focus on tort law seemed
somewhat out of place in the part of the book dealing with the conflict
between civil liberties and government regulation for public health
purposes, but I could not identify a better place to put this material given
the structure of the book.2 Gostin could also have grappled more with the
problem many people see in the tort litigation on tobacco and firearms:
The courts are effectively being asked and allowed to make public health
I1(2001)
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Table 1. Summary of Part Two of Public Health Law
Chapter Topic Examples of Issues Analyzed
Chapter 5 Personal - Public health surveillance
Privacy - Mandatory disease reporting
- Partner notification
- Population-based research
- Ethical underpinnings and legal status of health informational
privacy
- Confidentiality
- Model public health information privacy law
Chapter 6 Freedom of - Theories of health communication
Expression - Public health communications
- Commercial speech and public health
- Compelled commercial speech
- Regulation of cigarette advertising (case study)
Chapter 7 Bodily - Compulsory vaccination
Integrity - Testing and screening
- Compulsory screening and unreasonable search and seizure
- Compulsory screening and disability discrimination
- HIV screening or pregnant women and infants (case study)
Chapter 8 Autonomy - History of personal control measures
and Liberty - Isolation, quarantine, and compulsory hospitalization
- Compulsory physical examination and medical treatment
- Criminal law and knowing or willful exposure to infection
Chapter 9 Regulation of - History of commercial regulation
Economic - Public health and the rise of the administrative state
Behavior - Regulatory tools of public health agencies
- Economic liberty and public health--contracts, property uses,
and "takings"
Chapter 10 Tort Law and - Theories of tort liability
Public Health - Mass tort litigation and epidemiology in the courtroom
- Public health value of tort litigation
- The "tobacco wars" (case study)
- Tort litigation and firearms (case study)
- Limitations of tort law for public health
policy where legislatures have failed to take action. Finally, I could not help
but think of all the parallels between Gostin's analysis in Part Two on civil
liberties and the discourse in international human rights law about public
health actions by governments. Gostin has previously applied his approach
to individual rights in the public health context in the context of
international law,29 and Part Two easily lent itself to mentioning the
similarities in approach in domestic law and international law concerning
the tension between individual rights and the pursuit of public health.
One of the greatest strengths of Part Two of Public Health Law is that
Gostin provides ways to make the conflict between civil liberties and public
health regulation more palatable by laying out substantive and procedural
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principles that can help ensure that infringement of individual rights for
public health reasons are scientifically justified, non-discriminatory, and
the least restrictive measures possible. In Gostin's hands, the inevitable
conflicts between civil rights and public health law are principled,
constrained conflicts that demonstrate continuing respect for individual
rights and commitment to protecting the public's health. Such an
approach supports powerfully the contribution that respect for individual
rights can make to general public health.
IV. THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
Part Three of Public Health Law focuses on the future of public health
law in the United States. Chapter 11 analyzes the need for public health
law reform and provides principles to guide such reform. Gostin argues
that his final chapter answers the critique of American public health law
issued by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) in 1988. The IOM called for
reform of public health law to clarify the authority and responsibility of
public hiealth agencies and to empower them to deal effectively with
contemporary public health threats. Gostin takes up the IOM's challenge
by: (1) outlining the inherent problems of public health; (2) setting out
three conceptual principles that each public health statute should contain;
and (3) laying out the guidelines for public health law reform (table 2).
Gostin's analysis in Chapter 11 remains at a general level, and he does
not apply his reform principles to specific public health problems facing
the United States today. I understand why Gostin chose this approach , °









Politics, money, leadership, jurisdiction, legitimacy, and trust
The law should empower public health agencies to regulate individuals
and businesses for the public's health.
The law should restrain government in its exercise of power to achieve
the benefits of liberty and freedom.
The law should impose duties on government to promote the public's
health.
Create modern, consistent, and uniform public health laws.
Define a mission and essential functions for public health agencies.
Provide a full range of public health powers.
Impose substantive limits on the exercise of public health powers.
Impose procedural requirements on the exercise of public health
powers.
Provide strong protection against discrimination.
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but I found myself wanting to know what Gostin thinks are the priorities
for public health law reform in the United States today. While Gostin
mentions perennial difficulties that confront public health, he does not
discuss the depth of the problems now confronting American public
health. Public health literature, especially in connection with infectious
diseases, contains a great deal of hand-wringing and teeth-gnashing about
eroding public health capabilities in the United States. Gostin's argument
for public health law reform has an abstract, detached feel to it because
the general American political, economic, and social commitment to
public health as an endeavor is weak, and has been so for many years. The
political resurrection of public health seems a precondition for plans to
reform public health law.
Gostin mentions the conceptual and practical obstacles public health
faces, and he argues that it "needs opportunities to draw attention to its
resource requirements and achievements, and to develop constituencies
for programs. 3 He claims that the "lawmaking process provides just such
an opportunity,' 2 and that the law reform process can rebuild support and
commitment for public health. If antimicrobial resistance cannot get the
attention of legislators and politicians in the United States, then I have a
hard time believing that advocating general legal reform efforts will
stimulate and sustain a public health renaissance in the United States.
Legal reform efforts, I imagine, need to be parasitic on specific efforts to
deal with public health threats. Interesting legal reform efforts have, for
example, taken place in at least one state trying to cope with threats of
possible pandemic influenza and bio-terrorism.
In Chapter 11, Gostin does not focus on any specific public health
threats facing the United States. In other writings, Gostin and colleagues
made specific arguments and recommendations about public health law
reform with respect to the problem of infectious diseases.34 Gostin was also
involved in promoting model principles for health information privacy.3,' It
was easier to grasp those recommendations because they flowed from an
analysis of specific, contemporary problems in American public health. But
Gostin does not connect his general ideas on public health law reform to
the concrete challenges confronting American public health today and in
the foreseeable future. In other chapters, Gostin provided case studies of
current public health problems to illustrate the application of general legal
principles, rules, and precedents. Chapter 11 perhaps needed some
application of the general law reform guidelines to actual public health
problems.
For example, many experts believe that the general aging of the U.S.
population will present public health challenges, the likes of which
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American public health has not previously confronted. How should public
health law be reformed, if at all, in the face of the public health concerns
created by the aging of the population? Antimicrobial resistance is another
growing crisis in American public health that relates to infectious diseases.
How should Gostin's law reform guidelines be applied to the problem of
antimicrobial resistance, and what would be the scope and shape of the
resulting legal reform?
36
Another reason I yearned for some discussion of specific public health
threats in Chapter 11 is that such discourse might have revealed Gostin's
priorities for public health law reform. As Part One demonstrated, public
health law is a massive field. In Chapter 11, Gostin does not indicate
whether he thinks public health law reform is needed more urgently in,
say, infectious diseases than in environmental protection. Where should
public health law reform realistically be targeted first? Is there one area of
public health law (e.g., infectious diseases) that provides the most fertile
opportunity to apply all or most of Gostin's law reform guidelines?
Gostin's approach to public health law reform does have the advantage
of not being linked to specific public health problems that may not be
perceived as urgent in five or ten years time. His general approach might
not, therefore, become outdated, giving his ideas on public health law
reform longevity and permanence. My concern is, however, that by not
identifying specific public health problems and the lack of priorities for
legal reform, Gostin's arguments may lack immediacy and impact. Instead
of supporting the normative goal of making public health law transcendent
in American society and governance, Gostin's approach in Chapter 11 may
unintentionally invite further neglect.
My concern will be proved baseless if the readers of Public Health Law
understand and then apply Gostin's ideas on legal reform to specific areas
that require attention. Previously, reform of public health law was a
problem in search of principles. Gostin has now provided the principles
with which to approach the problem both generally, and in connection
with any specific public health threat facing the United States. Despite my
concerns about Chapter 11, this is a seminal and noble achievement.
CONCLUSION
Public Health Law will quickly become the leading intellectual and
practical guide to American public health law. In the United States, the
study of law is populated by works of enduring significance whose authors
became synonymous with a field of law: Corbin on Contracts, Prosser on
Torts, etc. Now, both the public health and legal disciplines have Gostin on
Public Health Law. Let neither my praise nor my criticism herein deflect
1 (2001)
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the readers of this Journal from appreciating the accomplishment and
contribution Gostin's book represents for all those interested in the future
of public health in the United States.
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Of Cloned Embryos, Humans, and Posthumans
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Cloning and the Future of Human Embryo Research. Edited by Paul Lauritzen.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. 291.
Since Ian Wilmut's report in Nature' that he had cloned an adult sheep
by transferring the nuclei of its somatic cells into an enucleated egg, two
other announcements in Britain and the United States have renewed the
debate on human embryo research and increased speculation about the
prospect of human cloning. In the summer of 2000, a panel of scientists in
Britain recommended that Parliament permit research on stem cells
derived from human embryos created by somatic cell nuclear transfer, a
technique used to produce "Dolly," the cloned sheep.2 British scientists
emphasized in their proposal that cloning techniques would be applied
only to produce stem cells for treatment purposes (therapeutic cloning),
and that under no circumstances would they contemplate approving
somatic cell nuclear replacement to produce a child (reproductive
cloning). Nonetheless, critics and the public fear that, in the absence of an
enforceable global treaty to ban the practice, cloning techniques
developed and perfected in Britain will inevitably be applied elsewhere to
produce human clones.
A week after the British proposal, the U.S. National Institutes of
Health (NIH) issued new guidelines to permit federally funded scientists
to conduct research on human embryonic pluripotent stem cells, so long
as these stem cells are derived by private parties from unused frozen
embryos created for infertility treatment in private clinics (spare embryo
research). The strong support of celebrities like Christopher Reeve and
Michael J. Fox, as well as the millions of people and their families whose
lives may be improved by stem cell research, may help assure that these
regulations remain in effect during George W. Bush's presidency. While
people in the United States and abroad generally approve the creation and
destruction of human embryos for stem cell research, there is virtually no
* Evelyne Shuster is an Adjunct Associate Professor of Philosophy in the Department of
Psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania Health System. She is also Director of the
Human Rights and Ethics Program at the Philadelphia Veterans Affairs Medical Center.
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support for creating children by cloning or for attempting to genetically
engineer embryos to make "better babies."
Reproductive cloning has raised near unanimous public
condemnation and has spurred a flurry of laws and legislative proposals to
outlaw cloning humans. Opponents have argued that reproductive cloning
robs children of their right to personal identity and commodifies them by
treating children as interchangeable, thereby devaluing human life and
threatening human rights and dignity.3 Cloning proponents argue that
reproductive cloning is no different from currently used methods of
assisted reproduction, and that cloning would offer infertile couples just
another way to have genetically related children, with the added bonus of
almost absolute genetic control over their offspring.
The new proposals that favor research into therapeutic cloning to
broaden our understanding of, and hopefully to find new treatments for,
diseases have tamed the public outcry at doing research on a slippery slope
that could lead to human reproductive cloning. But no responsible
scientist or physician currently suggests attempting to help create a child
by cloning because it is not safe. Questions of safety and efficiency are
legitimate concerns and may eventually be answered, at least partially, by
stem cell research. Once therapeutic cloning research begins, there may
be no sufficient safeguards to prevent sliding down a slippery slope from
therapeutic to reproductive cloning, and then to genetic engineering. The
ethical issues surrounding human embryo research (including the ethics of
human cloning) are thus even more relevant today than they were at
Dolly's birth in 1997.
Philosopher Paul Lauritzen, the editor of the series of essays that make
up Cloning and the Future of Human Embryo Research, is on the right track in
wanting to put Dolly's birth in the context of embryo research. As
Lauritzen explains in his introduction: "cloning is an outgrowth of IVF [in
vitro fertilization] technology, and we are unlikely to formulate an
adequate view of cloning unless we take this fact into account."4 We thus
need to see the birth of the cloned sheep, "as an intermediate step-
perhaps the penultimate step-leading from the birth of the first lVF baby,
Louise Brown, toward the birth of the first cloned human baby."5
Framing reproductive cloning within the realm of embryo research is
defensible; but broadening the frame to place cloning within the realm of
human reproduction is much more problematic. Nonetheless, Lauritzen
takes human reproduction as the focal point of this work, following the
lead of the 1994 report of the NIH Human Embryo Research Panel
(HERP) 6 and the President's National Bioethics Advisory Commission
(NBAC) Report on human cloning.
I1(2001)
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Lauritzen correctly notes that when NBAC decided to avoid the issues
related to embryo research (to sidestep the pitfalls of abortion politics that
mired HERP), it created two additional problems. First, it allowed NBAC to
proceed as if the status of the preimplantation embryo, and thus of embryo
research, had already been resolved, which is simply not the case. Second,
it gave the impression that the cloning issues identified by NBAC were
unrelated to the status of embryo. Thus, "[o]nce we recognize the
continuity between cloning and human embryo research, we are also in a
position to see that there are two obvious points of departure for this
volume.'
This selection of essays is a direct result of choosing an
embryo/reproduction framework. The book is composed of three parts:
Part 1, "Moral Status of the Preimplantation Embryo;" Part 2, "Debates
Surrounding Cloning and Embryo Research;" and Part 3, "Public Policy
Issues." There are three appendices reproducing the Executive Summaries
of the HERP report and the NBAC report, including excerpts from
Chapter 2 of the NBAC report entitled, "The Science and Application of
Cloning." The fourteen contributors to the twelve chapters are drawn
mainly from the field of philosophy and religion (only three authors are
from the legal profession). To me this is most welcome in an era where
philosophy and religion have ceased to strongly offer their critiques in
terms of majesty and sanctity, respectively. Six of the fourteen contributors
were either members of HERP, NBAC, or both, and for the most part,
their chapters offer little new. Nonetheless, the chapters read as if they
were written for the book, and the knitting together of ideas that
intertwine them is a credit to the book's editor.
Specifically, the first four of the five chapters in Part I of the book are
well argued and sufficiently open-ended for legitimate metaphysical
discussion of the moral status of the embryo. These chapters provide
excellent information, particularly with regard to the meaning of the
phrase "respect for embryos."9 As Bonnie Steinbock accurately observes in
the first chapter, "giving meaning to this concept of 'special respect' or
'serious moral consideration,' however, remains problematic."1' She takes
the position that human embryos have interests rather than rights because
they lack sentience, consciousness, or even simple awareness of any kind.
Thus, she argues, neither embryos nor gametes are harmed, wronged, or
deprived of anything by being used in research or destroyed. She
nonetheless insists that respect for human embryos can still be a
meaningful concept regardless of the way embryos are disposed of so long
as they are used to generate worthwhile benefits for humankind."
Steinbock adopts a version of utilitarian philosophy according to which the
25
Dubler: Limiting Technology in the Process of Negotiating Death
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2001
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
right act is a function of the good it generates. The obvious difficulty is
determining what counts as a good and what counts as a harm, and how to
measure them to determine the right balance between the good of
scientific progress and the harm society could incur in terms of less respect
for human life by using embryos instrumentally.
Courtney Campbell responds to Steinbock in the book's second
chapter (Source or Resource? Human Embryo Research as an Ethics
Issue). Campbell laments the pervasive influence of scientific reductionism
that causes us to view embryos as consumer products like a box of
Cheerios. He asks "whether the embryo is a source of life or a re-source of
science." Would it be too much to ask to show regret, anguish, or some
form of verbal expression of how unfortunate it is to perform research on
embryos? He believes that the moral consideration of respect for embryos
as illustrated by HERP and Steinbock is "merely a political facade used to
disguise and make publicly palatable scientific interests in having access to
embryos for research." 3 But Campbell stops short of saying that if respect
for human embryos is to have any meaning at all, destructive embryo
research should not be done.
The third and fourth chapters, by Maura Ryan (Creating Embryos for
Research: On Weighing Symbolic Costs) and James Keenan (Casuistry,
Virtue, and the Slippery Slope: Major Problems with Producing Human
Embryonic Life For Research Purposes) focus on whether there is any
justification for creating human embryos for research. Keenan, for
example, stresses that the way we view embryos determines how we use
them. And thus, "our willingness to manipulate the embryo determines
our understanding of the nature of the human embryo.' ' 4 Rather than
trying to settle the issue of the nature of embryos (on which people may
never agree), we should speak about what it is that humans do when we
produce human embryos for research. How does this affect the way we are
as humans qua humans, and our human dignity? This is a fair question
since, as Richard McCormick has observed, what we do to embryos we do
to ourselves, and this affects who we are and the way we view each other as
human beings.
1 5
The fifth chapter, by Alta Charo (Every Cell is Sacred: Logical
Consequences of the Argument from Potential in the Age of Cloning),
provides a bridge to the second part of this volume. She rightly points to
the problems (if not the absurdity) that logically follow from the argument
that we ought to respect embryos because of their potential to become
human beings. This argument, she contends, would have us granting
similar respect to sperm and eggs because both are necessary to produce
embryos, and also to any somatic cell, each of which cloning techniques
1 (2001l)
26
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 1 [2001], Iss. 1, Art. 17
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol1/iss1/17
BOOK REVIEW-SHUSTER
can use to produce a human embryo (of course with a human egg).
The second part of the book includes three essays, two of which are
authored by Dan Brock and Ronald Green, and are very supportive of
human cloning. The other essay by Laurie Zoloth (Born Again: Faith and
Yearning in the Cloning Controversy), is the strongest and most original in
the collection. Zoloth, a Jewish scholar, properly labels cloning to produce
a child "replication" rather than reproduction, and insightfully speculates
that replication cloning is intriguing "because it offers an answer to the
inevitability of alterity, estrangement, and death.""' Zoloth argues that
cloning represents the human desire for immortality, and points to our
fear of death and our longing for eternal return even if this is only by way
of genetic recycling. To her, cloning is neither about infertility (which can
be more easily managed with other means), nor about children. Cloning is
about self-absorption and narcissistic dreams (or nightmares).
Zoloth rightly maintains, for example, that "if cloning were about
children, we would need to be thinking about the 100,000 children in
foster care in America," (and I would add, the ten million AIDS orphans in
Africa) "and the way that race, illness, or oddity makes children
unadoptable, untakeable.""7 Zoloth muses that genetic replication cloning
is an answer to our deepest, "staggering mesmerizing panic at our own
mortality,' and "reflects the deepest of yearnings: for redemption and
resurrection into a better, purer, and transformed self, a self given a
second chance at an embodied human journey.""' This is why the "cloning
controversy reaches so deeply into the popular imagination."' ° Her
excellent essay makes for valued reflection that is likely to lead us to the
heart of the human soul, desire, and human frailty, and to the
fundamental question of why we contemplate human cloning. But because
it is so ambitious, it seems out of place in this part of the book.
The third and final part of the book includes four essays on public
policy issues, and illustrates the complexities and pitfalls at the intersection
of ethics and public policy, as well as the difficulties of achieving consensus
in bioethics. Carol Tauer, for example, points to "the current impasse in
public policy and the impasse in moral debate on human embryo research,
showing that the moral debate flounders because of different views as to
where the burden of proof lies."2' She properly asks: "Do those who defend
embryo research have to show why it is morally justifiable, or do those who
oppose it have to show why it is morally wrong?
22
The last essay in the book, by Heidi Forster and Emily Ramsey (The
Law Meets Reproductive Technology: The Prospect of Human Cloning),
highlights the limits of legislative proposals on cloning in the United States
and abroad. Regarding the United States, the authors raise the question of
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whether there is a fundamental constitutional right to clone. In their
answer, they cite the argument that "opponents of human cloning assert
that cloning does not fall within our previously recognized constitutional
liberties because cloning is distinguishable from currently practiced
reproductive technologies. ,23 In this view, they quote Steinbock with
approval: "cloning correlates with 'replication' not 'reproduction,' and is
not constitutionally protected.""2 The point should not be lost; if the
"opponents" are right, those who seek constitutional protection for
cloning as just another method of reproduction will be disappointed, just
as those bioethicists who recently sought constitutional protection for
physician-assisted suicide as a form of autonomy were disappointed.
This category point, i.e., cloning is genetic replication, not human
reproduction, also made by Zoloth, is at the heart of the cloning debate,
and has not been resolved. Ignoring or marginalizing it does not resolve or
even move the debate along. If raised at the outset of the book, rather than
at the end of the book, this category controversy would have had the
potential to shatter the entire book's framework. It would have rendered
irrelevant the familiar landmarks of embryo research and human
reproduction (exemplified by the HERP and NBAC reports) that bear the
stamp of time, geography, and culture, and with which we have become
accustomed to seeing cloning's supporters use to try to tame the creative
and wild profusion of ideas about cloning.
If cloning is not reproduction, then it represents a discontinuity with
current reproductive techniques, and thus there can be no similarities
between them: they are different in kind rather than degree. I think this
view is correct, and that the cleavage between cloning and reproduction
makes the concept of reproductive cloning itself an oxymoron.
Reproduction is sexual; cloning is asexual and produces a child without
the genetic input of two members of the opposite sex. Asexual cloning is
genetic replication because the child so conceived has only a copy of an
already existing genome that has been replicated. Of course we can try to
make genetic relationships "fit" into our current mold, but it is not easy. In
asexual genetic replication, the clone child will be the twin sister or
brother of his or her genetic "original." But the genetic original will also
fill the social role of parent. But this is neither an unproblematic twin
relationship nor an unproblematic parent-child relationship. Unlike
"natural" identical twins, created by sexual reproduction, the cloned child
is a "delayed twin," born after (usually long after) the birth of her genetic
twin original. This "delayed twin" condition is unique to cloning, and
creates intractable problems of filiation.
The central ethical issue is not the status of the human embryo created
1 (2001)
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by the Dolly technique, but the liberty of the resulting child. In delayed
genetic replication, the child must be compared to his or her "original,"
almost necessarily in a lopsided fashion. Vital restraints are likely to be
imposed on that child to follow in the wake of its genetic original, or to
avoid the "mistakes" made by the original. As Hans Jonas insightfully
argued more than twenty-five years ago, genetic replication robs the
resulting child of his or her right to an open future, a crime Jonas believed
should not be committed even once. 5 Of course, genes do not exclusively
determine who we are. Environment matters mightily. But this statement
does not change the intent or content of cloning, which must exclusively
be to make a genetic duplicate. That is all cloning is, and that is all cloning
can do. The prevailing international view is that creating a genetic replica
of an existing person is degrading to children by limiting their liberty and
thereby violating fundamental principles of human rights and human
dignity.
Moreover, far from being a treatment for infertility (as Green argues),
cloning abolishes the very concept of infertility itself. This is because in
asexual replication it would no longer matter for the purposes of having a
genetically related child whether the would-be parents are gametically
fertile or not. Each of our somatic cells can be used for replication cloning,
and thus everyone is able to self-replicate (assuming eggs are available and
women are willing to gestate the resulting embryos). If replication cloning
is equated with reproduction, to speak of cloning as treatment for
infertility is meaningless.
The unique characteristic of cloning demonstrates that it introduces a
fundamental difference in producing a child. One cannot simply assume
continuity between cloning and other methods of assisted reproduction.
The difference in kind in producing a child by cloning requires an analysis
of the threshold above which there are differences, and below which there
are similarities. Such analysis is indispensable for the establishment of even
the simple form of ordering such as the one adopted in this volume.
Failure to recognize this, is the book's most substantive weakness.
I recently read a piece by New York Times columnist, George Johnson
that caused me profound uneasiness and prompted me to reflect on how a
culture experiences the proximity of things, establishes support of things
we apprehend in one great leap, and determines the order by which these
things must be considered. In this piece, Johnson shows how "it has
become natural to think of [the Internet] biologically" and quotes
scientists who say they have found a universal law, "a power law," that
supports a number of listed things ranging from cells to the Internet.
2 6
Included in this list are: (1) a flourishing ecosystem of computers, (2) a
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sprawling brain of Pentium-powered neurons, (3) the networks of
molecules in a cell, (4) the networks of species in an ecosystem, (5) the
networks of people in a social group, (6) the Internet, and (7) the
metabolic networks of life-sustaining chemical reactions inside cells.
Johnson thus asks: How does this kind of ordering arise? In what kind of
structure do these seemingly diverse categories exist?
French philosopher Michel Foucault raises similar questions in his
book, The Order of Things, when he asks: What do we do when we classify?
What is the ground for establishing the validity of classification? On what
support and according to what grid of identities, similarities, and analogies
have we become accustomed to sort out so many different and similar
things? 2 7 Foucault observes (in the context of a simple kind of
enumeration) that while each of the things listed can be assigned a precise
meaning and a demonstrable content, there is a "monstrous quality" in the
enumeration that destroys the common ground on which the meeting of
each of these things is possible. In his words: "Absurdity destroys the and of
the enumeration by making impossible the in where the things
enumerated would be divided up.
,28
The category into which we "fit" human cloning constitutes the
common ground that links similar and different things, and each thing to
all the others. If, for example, we add cloning to the list of assisted
reproductive technologies, which includes in vitro fertilization, artificial
insemination, embryo splitting, embryo manipulation, infertility, etc., then
cloning will take on the quality of the things enumerated in that category.
Likewise, if we add cloning to the list of species alteration, which includes
asexual replication, egg manipulation, germline modification, etc., then
cloning will take on a much more sinister aspect.
"Fitting" cloning into the species alteration category is consistent with
what Ian Wilmut himself has said about his project to improve animals in
the context of animal cloning:
We do not seek simply to clone animal-to produce facsimiles of existing
creatures. This was never our agenda; it is just what other people thought
was important. Cloningfor us is and always has been an exercise in science
finding out how cells work and a technology that enables the genetic
transformation of animals.29
As Wilmut explains, somatic cell nuclear transfer was not even
invented for genetic replication but rather primarily to be used for
germline genetic modification to "improve" or "genetically enhance"
embryos that would produce animals with altogether new characteristics
(like the ability to produce specific proteins useful in the production of
I1(2001)
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human drugs) .30 This category point makes the possible application of
somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning to humans much more troublesome.
It is fair to say that it would have made for a much more up-to-date book
had a discussion of human genetic enhancement through embryo
manipulation been included.
The pairing of somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning and genetic
enhancement is powerful because it makes genetic replication (of
embryos) a means to the end of genetic transformation of the human
species. Genetic engineering through new or improved genes that can be
added to somatic cells (later used as the nuclei of embryos) to produce
"smarter" people, people with enhanced memory, and people resistant to
diseases and environmental insult, may be much more appealing to most
people than simple genetic replication. And if we want to try to stop the
eugenic project of genetically enhancing embryos to improve the "quality"
of our children, to the extent that human cloning techniques are necessary
to make genetic enhancement efficient, outlawing human replication
cloning will effectively outlaw human genetic enhancement as well.
We must think globally and at the species level about proposed
interventions that threaten to change the inherent characteristics of what it
means to be human. For this we need a mechanism to protect the integrity
of the human species, and a way to shift the burden of proof to those who
would change it, rather than to those who would protect it. But American
bioethicists are ill-equipped to provide a valuable contribution because of
their almost exclusive focus on the patient-physician relationship. This
focus gives American bioethicists a lot to say about reproductive treatment
for individuals and couples, but almost nothing to say about species
integrity or alteration. The lack of any species-level debate or global vision
is reflected in this book, and means that this selection of essays can provide
only a limited introduction to human cloning, and even less about the
more challenging question of human species alteration by genetic
manipulation of which human cloning is the harbinger.
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